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treated similarly: The Statute of Limitations. Girard Bank v. Bank of Penn. Town-
ship, 39 Pa. 92 (1861) (by holder); Smith v. Hubbard, 205 Mich. 44, 171 N.W. 546
(1919) (by drawer). Stop payment orders. Sutter v. Security Trust Co., 96 N.J.Eq.
644, 126 At. 435 (1924) (by holder); Carnegie Trust Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 213 N.Y.
301, 107 N.E. 693 (1915) (by drawer). And at least one court has felt that the situa-
tion presented by the principal case does not require different treatment because the
certification was secured by the drawer instead of the holder. Schlesinger v. Kurzrok,
47 Misc. 634, 94 N.Y.S. 442 (,9o5). Cf. McQueen v. Randall, 187 N.E. 286 (Ill. 1933).
See also, Walker v. Sellers, 201 Ala. 189, 77 So. 715 (1918); Stevenson v. Earling, 213
Ill. App. 395, affd. 290 Ill. 565, 125 N.E. 322 (1919); Olsen v. Bankers' Trust Co., 205
App. Div. 66o, 199 N.Y.S. 700 (1923). But see Bathgate v. Exchange Bank, ig Mo.
App. 583, 205 S.W. 875 (1918).
GERALDInE W. LUTES
Constitutional Law-Control of Selection of Presidential Electors by Congress-
[Federal].-The Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925), 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 241
-256 (1926), provides that voluntary political committees must make a public state-
ment of amounts received and expended in influencing the selection of presidential
electors. Defendants were indicted for violation of the act, and demurred on the
ground that the statute contravened U.S. Const., Art. II, § i, providing for state
regulation of the selection of presidential electors. Held, the act was a legitimate exer-
cise of the implied power of Congress to preserve the federal government from the
danger of corruption. Burroughs v. United States, 54 Sup. Ct. 287 (1934).
The power of Congress to regulate federal elections has been upheld on two theories:
First, reliance is placed on the express power to regulate the manner of holding con-
gressional elections granted by U.S. Const. Art. I, § 4. United States v. Gradwell, 243
U.S. 476, 481, 37 Sup. Ct. 407, 61 L. Ed. 857 (1917); cf. Siniley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355,
52 Sup. Ct. 397, 76 L. Ed. 795 (1932). Second, the power to regulate may result as one
"necessary and proper," under U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 18, for executing some other
power vested in Congress by the Constitution. i Willoughby, The Constitutional
Law of the United States (2d ed. 1929), 77-94, §§ 46-59.
Reliance cannot be placed on an express power for the present case, inasmuch as the
power to regulate the manner of appointing presidential electors is specifically vested
in the states by U.S. Const. Art. II, § I, Cl. 2. Cf. In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 1o Sup.
Ct. 586, 33 L. Ed. 951 (18go); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 13 Sup. Ct. 3, 36
L. Ed. 869 (1892). Furthermore a broad construction of the phrase "shall appoint, in
such manner" in Art. II, § I, Cl. 2 would seem to exclude federal regulation. A broad
construction would be consistent with the treatment given the term "manner of hold-
ing" an election containedin U.S. Const. Art. I, § 4, Cl. i, which has been interpreted
by the courts to include matters not a part of the actual election. Thus under Art. I,
§ 4, Cl. i, Congress may provide for punishment of election officials for neglect of duty
or for fraud. Ex parte Siebold, 1oo U.S. 371, 25 L. Ed. 717 (1879); Ex parte Clarke, ioO
U.S. 399,25 L. Ed. 715 (1879); In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 8 Sup. Ct. 1263, 32 L. Ed. 274
(1888); In re Cohen, 62 F. (2d) 249 (C.C.A. 2d 1932). Corporations may be prohibited
from contributing to campaign funds. United States v. United States Brewers' Assn., 239
Fed. 163 (D.C. Pa. 1916). Candidates may be required to file sworn statements of
campaign expenses. United States v. Cameron, 282 Fed. 684 (D.C. Ariz. 1922). The
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court in the present case, however, construes "shall appoint, in such manner" narrowly
so that it does not negative an implied federal power. The result of this construction,
if not the construction itself, is consistent with the effect of the interpretation given
Art. I, § 4, Cl. i, since both tend to increase congressional power.
Implied powers, inferable from the existence of one or more of the express powers of
Congress, may occasionally be exercised to regulate matters incidental to federal elec-
tions. Cf. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. (U.S.) 457, 532-533, 2o L. Ed. 287 (1871);
United States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry. Co., 16o U.S. 668, i6 Sup. Ct. 427, 40 L. Ed. 576
(1896). Thus Congress may prohibit interference with the right to vote in federal elec-
tions in exercising its power to protect the rights of citizens under the Constitution.
Ex parte Yarbrough, iio U.S. 651, 4 Sup. Ct. 152, 28 L. Ed. 274 (1884); United States
v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 386, 35 Sup. Ct. 904, 59 L. Ed. 1355 (1905). Under the power
to obtain information as to authorized legislation, Congress may punish for perjury in
inquiries before it as to campaign expenditures of candidates for election to the Senate.
United States v. Seymour, 5o F. (2d) 930 (D.C. Neb. 1931). Congress may prohibit the
solicitation or receipt of contributions for political purposes between federal officers, in
exercising its power to control such officers. Ex parte Curtis, io6 U.S. 371, i Sup. Ct.
381, 27 L. Ed. 232 (1882); United States v. Thayer, 209 U.S. 39, 42, 28 Sup. Ct. 426, 52
L. Ed. 673 (19o8); United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 5o Sup. Ct. 167, 74 L. Ed.
5o8 (1930). Several cases indicate that such implied powers over matters incidental to
federal elections may be derived from the express power to regulate the election itself.
See Ex parte Yarbrough, iio U.S. 65i, 4 Sup. Ct. 152, 28 L. Ed. 274 (1884); United
States v. U.S. Brewers' Assn., 239 Fed. 163 (D.C. Pa. 1916).
The existence of an implied power has been denied, however, on the ground that it
is unnecessary inasmuch as the police power of the states may be used to protect the
purity of elections. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 41 Sup. Ct. 469, 65 L. Ed.
913 (1921), criticized in 22 Col. L. Rev. 54 (1922); 19 Mich. L. Rev. 86o (1921). The
weakness of this argument lies in the fact that it ignores the well established principle
that it is not the court's function to consider the actual necessity of the power. Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 3 6, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819); Juilliard v. Greenman,
rio U.S. 421, 4 Sup. Ct. 132, 28 L. Ed. 204 (i884 );Fairbanks v. United States, 181 U.S.
283, 21 Sup. Ct. 648, 45 L. Ed. 862 (1901).
The present case in finding an implied power to keep presidential elections free from
corruption would seem to show a definite change in attitude on the part of the court
since the Newberry case.
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Constitutional Law-Definition of Phrase "Prima Facie Evidence"-Disorderly
Conduct Statutes-[Michigan].-The defendants were convicted of being disorderly
persons because of having engaged "in an illegal occupation or business." The statute
under which they were convicted made "Proof of recent reputation for engaging in an
.illegal occupation of business .... prima facie evidence of being engaged in an illegal
occupation or business." Michigan Acts (I931), No. 328, § 167. Held, the statute is
unconstitutional as denying "due process of law." People v. Licavoli, 250 N.W. 52o
(Mich. X933), North, Weadock, Sharpe, JJ., dissenting.
The majority of the court defined the statute to mean that evidence of reputation
of being engaged in illegal occupation, unexplained or uncontradicted, would alone be
sufficient to warrant the jury in convicting. The minority, however, took the view that
